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I. INTRODUCTION
You may ask: why an article proposing structural reform of mu-
nicipal law in Arkansas? After all, in the past twenty years Arkansas
voters rejected two attempts to restructure municipal law;1 each at-
tempt proposed restructuring the basic relationship between the state
and its municipal corporations within the framework of proposed
constitutions.2
Changing the structural relationship between a state and its mu-
nicipal corporations changes the relationship between the citizen and
the state and between the citizen and local government. A reallocation
of power between the state and its municipal corporations affects the
ability of the state to control local government actions, affects the indi-
vidual's interaction with the state, and affects the individual's relation-
ship with her local government. Even though voters rejected the two
proposed constitutions, those attempted restructurings produced one
fundamental change in local government. County governance was sub-
stantially restructured in 1974 as a result of work done on the proposed
constitution of 1970.'
It is now time to examine the relationship between the state and
its municipal corporations. The citizens of Arkansas deserve a worka-
1. Proposed ARK. CONST. of 1970 with Comments (published Feb. 10, 1970, by Seventh
Ark. Const. Convention); Proposed ARK. CONST. of 1980 with Comments (published August,
1980, by Eighth Ark. Const. Convention).
2. Proposed ARK. CONST. of 1970, art. VI, §§ 10-14, 16; Proposed ARK. CONST. of 1980,
art. VI, §§ 10-16, art. VII, §§ 9-11, 15. See infra notes 230-74 and accompanying text.
3. ARK. CONST. amend. LV. Amendment 55 substantially incorporated the proposals for
county government made by the Seventh Ark. Const. Convention. See Proposed ARK. CONST. of
1970, art. VI, §§ 1-9.
[Vol. 15:175
ARKANSAS MUNICIPAL LAW
ble, equitable structure - with well-defined, understandable options -
for municipal government. This article will (1) review the development
of Arkansas municipal law from the time of statehood; (2) consider the
implications of the current structure for efficient government action
and meaningful citizen control; and (3) conclude with proposed amend-
ments to the Arkansas Constitution of 1874.
To answer the question initially proposed: by writing this article, I
hope that the people of Arkansas will have an opportunity to update
constitutional provisions relating to municipal corporations. Even
though voters have twice rejected new constitutions, they approved the
county governance amendment" and the constitutional provisions con-
trolling municipal indebtedness.5 Apparently, the voters are willing to
deal with constitutional reform piecemeal.
II. THE DEVELOPMENT OF ARKANSAS MUNICIPAL LAW
A. Arkansas Constitutional History
1. The 1836 Constitution
The Arkansas Constitution of 1836 had very little to say about
municipal government in the newly created state. One section ad-
dressed the creation or restructuring of counties within the state. 6 The
county court, "holden by the Justices of the Peace," was created and
vested with "jurisdiction in all matters relating to county taxes, dis-
bursements of money for county purposes,.and in every case that may
be necessary to the internal improvements and local concerns of the
respective counties."' 7 Voters in each township (a unit nowhere created
by or defined in the 1836 constitution) elected justices of the peace8
and one constable;' incorporated towns - again, a unit of local govern-
ment nowhere created or defined in the 1836 constitution - could have
a separate constable. 10
As difficult as it is to believe for anyone familiar with current Ar-
kansas constitutional provisions, the 1836 constitution had even less to
say about raising revenues and making expenditures on either the state
4. ARK. CONST. amend. LV.
5. See ARK. CONST. amends. LXII, LXV.
6. ARK. CONST. of 1836, art. IV, § 29.
7. Id., art. VI, § 9.
8. Id. § 15.




level or the municipal level. Article VII, Revenue, section 1 provided
simply that "all revenues shall be raised by taxation to be fixed by
law.""1 Section 2 provided that "[a]ll property subject to taxation shall
be taxed according to its value - that value to be ascertained in such
manner as the General Assembly shall direct; making the same equal
and uniform throughout the State .... [N]o other or greater amount of
revenue shall at any time be levied than required for the necessary ex-
penses of the government, unless by a concurrence of two-thirds of both
houses of the General Assembly."1 " Section 3 limited poll-taxes to
county purposes; 13 section 4 prohibited different or greater taxes "on
the productions or labor of the country than may be required for ex-
penses of inspection."1 4
The power of the state or its political subdivisions to incur indebt-
edness received brief mention. The 1836 constitution authorized the
pledging of the faith and credit of the state to raise funds to establish
two state banks. 15 The power to borrow was not otherwise mentioned.
Expenditure of funds was given equally short treatment. The 1836
constitution simply required an appropriation by law to withdraw any
money from the treasury and required that a "regular statement and
account of the receipts and expenditures of all public money . . . be
published with the promulgation of the laws."' 6
A state constitution is a limitation on the power of the sovereign
rather than a grant of power.1 7 Because the 1836 constitution imposed
no other limitations, the general assembly remained vested with discre-
tion to address issues such as forms of municipal government, maxi-
mum rates and types of taxation, borrowing of funds, and exercise of
power in general by municipal corporations.
2. The 1861 and 1864 Constitutions
Legislative discretion remained the rule of the day under the Ar-
kansas Constitutions of 1861 and 1864. While there were minor revi-
I1. Id., art. VII, § 1.
12. Id. § 2.
13. Id. § 3.
14. Id. § 4.
15. Id., art. VII, § 1.
16. Id., art. VII, § 4.
17. State v. Ashley, I Ark. 513 (1839). "The legislature then can exercise all power that is
not expressly or impliedly prohibited by the constitution; for whatever powers are not limited or
restricted, they inherently possess as a portion of the sovereignty of the State." Id. at 538.
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sions related to operation of government and the raising and expendi-
ture of funds,18 fundamental decisions on allocation of power to
municipal corporations remained with the general assembly.
3. The 1868 Constitution
The Arkansas Constitution of 1868 marked the beginning of inclu-
sion of more detailed constitutional provisions relating to both state and
municipal expenditures, revenue raising, and the relationship between
the state and its political subdivisions. Article V, section 20 made ex-
plicit that which had been implicit: appropriations were to be made by
bill only, never by resolution. 9 But the 1868 constitution went much
further. Article V, section 28 authorized the general assembly to "en-
act laws providing for county, township or precinct governments.
' 20
Section 40 of article V required that a general law be used to provide
for vacating or altering any road or street laid out in any city or vil-
lage.2 But the real shift occurred in sections 47 and 49 of article V.
Section 47 prohibited the general assembly from passing any law au-
thorizing any municipal corporation to pass any laws contrary to the
general laws of the state or to levy any tax on real or personal property
to a greater extent than two per centum of its assessed value.22 Section
49 of the 1868 constitution required the general assembly to provide for
the organization of cities and incorporated villages by general law and
to "restrict their power of taxation, assessment, borrowing money, con-
tracting debts, and loaning their credit, so as to prevent the abuse of
such power."2"
The 1868 constitution for the first time contained detailed provi-
sions outlining the responsibilities of the state for free public education.
Article IX contained numerous provisions that addressed both the rais-
ing of necessary revenues for public education and the application of
those revenues.24 And article X, entitled "Finances, Taxation, Public
18. ARK. CONST. of 1861, art. VII, § 3 authorized the levy of a poll tax for county or
corporation purposes. Section 2 authorized the legislature to approve a county tax for building
levees. Id. § 2. Both of these provisions were eliminated in the Arkansas Constitution of 1864.
19. ARK. CONST. of 1868, art. V, § 20.
20. Id. § 28.
21. Id. § 40. See infra notes 126-31 and accompanying text.
22. ARK. CONST. of 1868, art. V, § 47.
23. Id. § 49.
24. The proceeds from disposition of all lands received from the United States, from prop-
erty received by escheat, and from undesignated devises to the state were placed in a common
fund, with the income thereof, together with the proceeds of a poll tax and so much of the state's
19931
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Debt and Expenditures," contained seventeen sections addressing both
the raising of revenues and incurring of debt.25
4. The 1874 Constitution
The 1868 constitution set the tenor for the current Arkansas con-
stitution adopted in 1874. During the period immediately before adop-
tion of the 1868 and 1874 constitutions, municipal corporations were
actively involved in enticing transportation facilities to build in their
areas by offering not only land, but also the loan of funds .2  Time
proved many of these incentives to be very costly as the ventures failed
either to be completed or to produce the expected benefits, leading to a
rash of municipal bond defaults.2 7 Arkansas adopted its 1874 constitu-
tion at a time of active state constitutional revision aimed at limiting
the ability of local governments to incur indebtedness or lend credit to
private activities. The consequences of the prevailing public mood are
evident in the Arkansas Constitution of 1874.
Once again, a specific provision relating to the organization of mu-
nicipal corporations instructed the general assembly not only to provide
for the organization of cities and incorporated towns, but also to re-
strict the "power of taxation, assessment, borrowing money and con-
tracting debts, so as to prevent the abuse of such power."2 8 And, as was
typical of constitutional provisions at the time, article XII, section 5
prohibited a county or municipal corporation from becoming a stock-
holder in a corporation or lending its credit to any association, corpora-
tion, or individual.29 Article XVI, section 1 contained a similar prohibi-
tion against a municipal corporation or county lending its credit.
30
With certain minor exceptions, the state could not assume the debt of
any county, town, city, or other corporation.3'
general revenues as required, dedicated to maintaining free schools. ARK. CoNsT. of 1868, art. IX,
§ 4. If those funds were not adequate, the general assembly was directed to levy a tax as deemed
proper. Id. § 7.
25. A poll tax could only be levied for school purposes. ARK. CoNsT. of 1868, art. X, § I.
Both tangible and intangible personal property were subject to tax. Id. §§ 2-3. Voter approval was
required before the state or its counties could lend their credit. Id. § 6.
26. See, e.g., M. David Gelfand, Seeking Local Government Financial Integrity Through
Debt Ceilings, Tax Limitations, and Expenditure Limits: The New York City Fiscal Crisis, the
Taxpayers' Revolt, and Beyond, 63 MINN. L. REv. 545, 547-49 (1979).
27. Id. at 547.
28. ARK. CONST. art. XI1, § 3.
29. Id. § 5.
30. Id., art. XVI, § 1.
31. Id., art. XII, § 12.
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After 1874 there was no question about types of indebtedness mu-
nicipal corporations could incur; article XVI, section 1 prohibited "any
county, city, town or municipality [from] ever issu[ing] any interest
bearing evidences of indebtedness.
'"32
But the real limitations on the scope of local action were found in
article XII, section 4.1 As originally enacted, the section limited mu-
nicipal tax levies on both real and personal property to five mills on the
dollar per year and provided that no municipal corporation could be
authorized to enact laws contrary to the general laws of the state. In
1924 the citizens of Arkansas appeared to foreclose municipal corpora-
tions incurring debt of any type. By adopting Amendment 10 to the
constitution, voters amended article XII, section 4 to provide that coun-
ties, cities, and incorporated towns could not make any contract or is-
sue any scrip, warrant, or other evidence of indebtedness in excess of
revenues for the fiscal year.
8 4
Judicial interpretation of the various constitutional provisions, de-
pending on your point of view, either eviscerated or made realistic the
language through interpretative devices.3 5 We must follow this pattern
through 1986 in our effort to understand the current power allocation
between the state and its municipal corporations.
B. Application of the 1874 Constitution by the Arkansas Supreme
Court and the General Assembly
Only by understanding the changes in constitutional interpretation
by the Arkansas Supreme Court, the responses to those changes by the
legislature and the people, and the complex structure of overlapping
political subdivisions permitted by the current constitution and statutes
can one appreciate the need for reform. Because I will argue that local
government authority is too limited under the Arkansas structure, we
must explore and understand the relationship of the state and its mu-
nicipal corporations.
32. Id., art. XV1, § I (amended 1918, 1926, 1984).
33. Id., art. XI, § 4.
34. Id. See id. publisher's note.
35. Because ARK. CONST. art. XII, § 12 provides that "the state shall never assume or pay
the debt or liability of any county, town, city, or other corporation whatever" (emphasis added),
the Arkansas Supreme Court ruled that the section did not prevent the state from assuming the
debt of road districts or school districts. Bush v. Martineau, 174 Ark. 214, 295 S.W. 9 (1927);
Ruff v. Womack, 174 Ark. 971, 298 S.W. 222 (1927). For a more significant judicial interpreta-
tion of the constitutional debt limitations, see infra notes 47-61 and accompanying text.
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1. The Effect of Dillon's Rule
At the beginning of the twentieth century, a vocal minority of
commentators argued that citizens of a state enjoyed an inherent right
of local self government. 36 Although widely debated, the argument re-
ceived little favor in the courts. 37 Arkansas was no exception. The Ar-
kansas Supreme Court in 1922 stated that "[m]unicipal corporations
are created to aid the state government in the regulation and adminis-
tration of local affairs; '38 in 1963 the court reaffirmed that position in
City of Piggott v. Eblen.3 9 In 1935 the court further undercut any no-
tion of an inherent right to local self government in Kitchens v. City of
Paragould, stating "[w]e regard as axiomatic that cities and towns are
creatures of the Legislature, subject to its control, and that they can
function only within the limits fixed by law. '40
The Arkansas Supreme Court did not frame the argument against
an inherent right of local self government on its own. The argument
started in reaction to a statement made in Judge Dillon's treatise on
the law of municipal corporations. In fact, Dillon's Rule has caused no
end of mischief. Judge Dillon wrote in his now famous (infamous?)
statement:
It is a general and undisputed proposition of law that a municipal
corporation possesses, and can exercise, the following powers, and no
others: First, those granted in express words; second, those necessa-
rily or fairly implied in, or incident to, the powers expressly granted;
third, those essential to the declared objects and purposes of the cor-
poration - not simply convenient, but indispensable. Any fair, rea-
sonable doubt concerning the existence of power is resolved by the
courts against the corporation, and the power is denied. . . . These
principles are of transcendent importance, and lie at the foundation
of the law of municipal corporations.
4 '
The Arkansas Supreme Court embraced Dillon's Rule and continues to
apply it.42 Quoting its opinion in Yancy v. City of Searcy,4" the court
36. See Gerald E. Frug, The City as a Legal Concept, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1057, 1113
(1980); 1 EUGENE MCQUILLIN, THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 1.42 (3d ed. rev. vol.
1987).
37. Frug, supra note 36, at 114-15.
38. Cumnock v. City of Little Rock, 157 Ark. 471, 243 S.W. 57 (1922).
39. 236 Ark. 390, 393, 366 S.W.2d 192, 194 (1963).
40. 191 Ark. 940, 945, 88 S.W.2d 843, 846 (1935).
41. JOHN F. DILLON, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 55, at
101-02 (3d ed. 1881) (first and last emphasis added).
42. See City of Little Rock v. Raines, 241 Ark. 1071, 411 S.W.2d 486 (1967); McClendon
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stated the governing law of Arkansas in City of Piggott v. Eblen:
It is a general and undisputed proposition of law that a munici-
pal corporation possesses and can exercise the following powers and
no others: First, those granted in express words; second, those neces-
sarily or fairly implied in or incident to the powers expressly granted;
third, those essential to the accomplishment of the declared objects
and purposes of the corporation, - not simply convenient, but indis-
pensable. Any fair, reasonable, substantial doubt concerning the exis-
tence of power is resolved by the courts against the corporation, and
the power is denied."
By adopting Dillon's Rule, the court relegated local government to an
assisting role in dealing with local affairs: rather than lead, local gov-
ernment is to follow; rather than be innovative in solving local
problems, the local government is there to assist the state in imple-
menting the solution formulated in the state legislature and can act
only as authorized by the state constitution and statutes.
2. Municipal Revenue and Debt
Money is necessary for a municipal corporation to provide any
meaningful services, offer protection, or take action. In defining the
ability of a municipal corporation to raise money on a current basis, the
Arkansas Supreme Court actually went beyond the language of Dil-
lon's Rule:
Municipal corporations can levy no taxes, general or special, un-
less the power to do so be plainly and unmistakably conferred. The
power must be given either in express words or by necessary or unmis-
takable implication. It cannot be deduced by doubtful inferences from
other powers, or from any consideration of convenience or
advantage.
45
In the absence of constitutional grants of power, the need for a specific-
delegation of the power to tax, coupled with the general limitation that
flows from Dillon's Rule on raising revenues from other sources, leaves
the municipal corporation at the mercy of the legislature. Considered
v. City of Hope, 217 Ark. 367, 230 S.W.2d 57 (1950); Bain v. Fort Smith Light & Traction Co.,
116 Ark. 125, 172 S.W. 843 (1915).
43. 213 Ark. 673, 212 S.W.2d 546 (1948).
44. 236 Ark. 390, 392-93, 366 S.W.2d 192, 194 (1963).
45. Fort Smith & V.B. Bridge Co. v. Hawkins, 54 Ark. 509, 513, 16 S.W. 565, 565 (1891).
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with the constitutional limitations on the power to borrow money,46 this
problem becomes more acute and obvious. At the same time, a glance
out of a window offers convincing proof that municipal corporations are
in business in Arkansas.
Municipal corporations are in fact raising and spending money for
all types of purposes. While the lack of an inherent right of local self
government reflected in the adoption of Dillon's Rule and minimal
grants of power in the Arkansas constitution makes the municipal cor-
poration dependent on the legislature, the legislature has responded.
The general assembly, with the blessing of the Arkansas courts, has
been perfectly willing to give local governments the ability to layer
complexity upon complexity, to layer debt over-debt - both with and
without the requirement of an approving referendum-, and to conceal
(or at least obfuscate) the machinations from local residents. The vot-
ers of Arkansas must also accept direct responsibility for this Rube
Goldberg assemblage, for much of it has been achieved as a result of
constitutional amendment. The development of the use of revenue
bonds by municipalities in Arkansas demonstrates the current
complexity.
3. Revenue Bonds as Constitutional Indebtedness
The total prohibition on municipal corporation indebtedness ended
in 1926 when the voters adopted Amendment 13 to the constitution.'
7
Cities of the first and second class gained the authority to issue bonds
for specific enumerated purposes if approved by
a majority of the qualified electors of said municipality voting on the
question at an election held for the purpose." '48 Amendment 13 re-
quired that "any municipality issuing any bonds shall, before or at the
time of doing so, levy a direct tax payable annually not exceeding the
amount limited as above, sufficient to pay the interest on such bonds
as the same matures, and also sufficient to pay and discharge the prin-
cipal of all such bonds at their respective maturities.49
46. See infra notes 47-61 and accompanying text.
47. See 1927 Ark. Acts 1210. Arkansas Constitution amendment XIII amended Arkansas
Constitution article Xvi, § 1, but amendment XIII was subsequently repealed by Arkansas Con-
stitution amendment LXII, § 11. But see infra notes 62-64 and accompanying text discussing
districts incurring debt to construct light and water facilities, with the facilities transferred to the
city after completion.




Among the specific enumerated purposes for which bonds could be is-
sued was the "purchasing, extending, improving, enlarging, building, or
construction of ... light plants, and distributing systems therefor."50
Arkansas voters reasonably could have concluded that, pursuant to
amendment 10 (which prohibited local governments from incurring
debt in excess of annual revenues) and Amendment 13, no municipal
indebtedness could be incurred without their approval. The absolute
prohibition contained in the constitution as originally adopted was
gone, but only as the result of adding language at the end of article
XVI, section 1 that started "provided." 5' After the adoption of Amend-
ment 13, article XVI, section 1 stated in its first paragraph that no
interest bearing evidence of indebtedness could be issued by municipal
corporations, but then the eleven new paragraphs added by Amend-
ment 13 authorized issuance of bonds for specific purposes with voter
approval. That approach to drafting the amendment seemed to main-
tain the absolute prohibition on municipal indebtedness except as spe-
cifically modified by the proviso. Remember that article XII, section 4
was amended by adoption of Amendment 10 in 1924 to provide that no
city or town could "authorize the issuance of any contract or ... other
evidences of indebtedness in excess of the revenue for such city or town
for the current fiscal year."52 One would conclude that the only indebt-
edness that could be incurred was voter approved tax supported bonds.
The Arkansas Supreme Court, however, interpreted the provisions
differently.
Courts around the nation, faced with similar state constitutional
restrictions, were distinguishing between bonds payable from taxes and
bonds payable from revenues derived from operation of a facility con-
structed or acquired with the proceeds of the bond issue. 53 In 1932 the
Arkansas Supreme Court adopted that distinction, holding that revenue
bonds issued to build a light plant were not subject to the prohibition
against indebtedness found in article XII, section 4.54 The court further
held that the article XVI, section 1 requirement of an election did not
apply as the city did not own or seek to acquire a power plant, but
rather had entered into a contract with respect to a power plant that
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. ARK. CONST. amend. X.
53. 15 EUGENE MCQUILLIN, THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 41.31 (3d ed. rev.
vol. 1985).
54. McCutchen v. City of Siloam Springs, 185 Ark. 846, 49 S.W.2d 1037 (1932).
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the city had "taken over for the purposes of operation and maintenance
only in trust for an improvement district.
55
Two years later in Snodgrass v. City of Pocahontas, the court ex-
pressly held inapplicable the election requirement found in article XVI,
section 1 before a municipal corporation could issue bonds payable
solely from the revenues generated by the improvement financed by the
proceeds of the bond issue." The city, relying on Act 131 of 1933,11
issued bonds without an election. The court affirmed the trial court's
opinion upholding the validity of the bonds, establishing that issuance
of revenue bonds (1) could be authorized by statute, notwithstanding
the provisions of article XVI, section 1 and article XII, section 4 and
(2) did not require voter approval notwithstanding the provisions of ar-
ticle XVI, section 1.58
For the next fifty years, the court faced a number of cases testing
how far the exception for revenue bonds would stretch.59 When the
court decided in 1986 that it had been wrong in Snodgrass and held
that revenue bonds required voter approval,60 Arkansas voters amended
the constitution by adoption of Amendment 65, which specifically au-
thorizes the issuance of revenue bonds without voter approval.61
This fifty year history of the expansion of power in a municipal
corporation to incur debt, capped by a sudden judicial reversal, illus-
trates the struggle among the people acting through the initiative pro-
cess to amend the constitution, the people acting through the legisla-
ture, and the court to strike the proper balance between the authority
of a municipal corporation to deal with local needs and the necessity of
the state to protect the interests of the individual citizen and citizens
collectively from abuse by the municipal corporation. But those early
55. Id. at 850, 49 S.W.2d at 1038-39.
56. 189 Ark. 819, 75 S.W.2d 223 (1934).
57. ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 14-234-201 to -218 (Michie 1987 & Supp. 1991).
58. 189 Ark. 819, 824, 75 S.W.2d 223, 227.
59. See, e.g., Purvis v. City of Little Rock, 282 Ark. 102, 667 S.W.2d 936 (1984); Purvis v.
Hubbell, 273 Ark. 339, 620 S.W.2d 282 (1981); McArthur v. Smallwood, 225 Ark. 328, 281
S.W.2d 428 (1955). For a complete review of the Arkansas cases upholding issuance of revenue
bonds, see Mark K. Halter, Note, Revenue Bonds - the Election Requirement: City of Hot
Springs v. Creviston, 9 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L.J. 63 (1986-87).
60. City of Hot Springs v. Creviston, 288 Ark. 286, 705 S.W.2d 415 (1986).
61. ARK. CONST. amend. LXV. An election is required if the proceeds of the bond issue will
be used to finance hotels, motels, rental or professional office buildings, or recreation or entertain-
ment facilities. Id. § 2(b). The General Assembly and municipal corporations in Arkansas con-
tinue the effort to overcome the debt limitations imposed by Ark. Const. art. XVI, § 1. For a
recent attempt that failed, see Brown v. City of Stuttgart, No. 92-849 (Ark. Feb. 22, 1993).
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cases sanctioning non voter-approved revenue bonds contributed to the
current complexity of Arkansas municipal law in another fundamental
way.
Two additional "big picture" issues must be addressed before any
attempt at restructuring the fundamental balance between the state
and its municipal corporations can be undertaken. The structural com-
plexity resulting from legislative authorization of various types of mu-
nicipal corporations, special districts, and special authorities must be
reviewed; then, the traditional limitations on tax rates contained in
state constitutions must be considered.
4. A Multitude of Political Subdivisions
McCutchen v. City of Siloam Springs and Snodgrass, while not
addressing the constitutional issue directly, indirectly upheld the crea-
tion of improvement districts and recognized them as entities separate
from the sponsoring municipal corporation. In McCutchen, an improve-
ment district was created to finance and construct a power plant and
distribution system. Upon completion, it was put under the total man-
agement and control of the city. 2 The same approach was used for the
construction of waterworks in Snodgrass.13 In each case the municipal-
ity assumed complete management of and responsibility for public im-
provements owned and financed by an issuer created specifically to fi-
nance and construct the improvements. The Arkansas Supreme Court
treated the districts as legal entities distinct and separate from the mu-
nicipal corporation.64 Doing so created an escape hatch from the re-
strictive debt limitations imposed on municipal corporations by the
1874 constitution because the constitution imposed no restraints on the
creation of districts or on a district's power to incur debt.
Recognition of a district or authority as a separate issuer reached
its zenith in 1955 when the court decided McArthur v. Smallwood.6 5
The legislature created the Arkansas Justice Building Commission66
and authorized it to issue bonds payable from sources designated in the
act: rental payments to be received from the Workmen's Compensation
Commission and the Public Service Commission and direct costs col-
62. 185 Ark. 846, 848, 49 S.W.2d 1037, 1038 (1932).
63. 189 Ark. 819, 821, 75 S.W.2d 223, 224 (1934).
64. McCutchen, 185 Ark. at 850, 49 S.W.2d at 1038-39; Snodgrass, 189 Ark. at 824, 75
S.W.2d at 225.
65. 225 Ark. 528, 281 S.W.2d 428 (1955).
66. Id. at 330, 281 S.W.2d at 430.
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lected by counties.67 None of the funds were to be paid into the state
treasury; rather, the two commissions and the counties were required to
remit the funds directly to the Justice Building Commission by deposit
in the Justice Building Fund.68 The court held that the bonds were not
issued by or obligations of the state and thus, violated no constitutional
provisions regarding the State of Arkansas incurring debt.69 Mc-
Cutchen, Snodgrass, and Smallwood leave no doubt. The citizen who
believes that debt limitations in the 1874 constitution severely limit ei-
ther the state or a political subdivision in incurring debt has been
fooled - albeit understandably so.
The general assembly has exploited this escape hatch by enacting
legislation authorizing the creation of numerous entities described as
"districts." The powers of each, the method of creation of each, and the
governance of each is subject to statutory provisions for that particular
district. A few examples demonstrate the problems facing an Arkansas
resident who wants to know what is being done.
Start with consideration of drainage improvement districts. These
districts are ones "the main object of which is the construction of lev-
ees." 70 Once created, the district is governed by a board of commission-
ers appointed by the county court. 71 The district may issue bonds paya-
ble from the assessment of benefits in the district.72
First class cities with a mayor-council form of government are not
ignored; they may create municipal drainage improvement districts en-
compassing all or part of the city's territory.7 3 The district is governed
by an appointed board of commissioners; 7' the district may issue
bonds 5 payable from the assessments levied against real property
within the district.
7 6
Property owners can petition for the creation of districts. A subur-
ban improvement district, which can encompass territory within a mu-
nicipal corporation, may be created by the county court upon petition
67. Id. at 330-31, 281 S.W.2d at 430.
68. Id. at 331, 281 S.W.2d at 430.
69. Id. at 335, 281 S.W.2d at 433.
70. ARK. CODE ANN. § 14-121-102 (Michie 1987).
71. Id. 99 14-121-301, -305 (Michie 1987 & Supp. 1991).
72. Id. § 14-121-308 (Michie 1987).
73. Id. § 14-122-102 (Michic Supp. 1991).
74. Id. 9 14-122-106 (Michie 1987).
75. Id. 9 14-122-201.
76. Id. 9 14-122-208.
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of a majority of the realty owners in the proposed district. 7' Once cre-
ated, the district is governed by a board of commissioners78 which may
issue bonds79 payable from a tax levy apportioned on the basis of as-
sessed benefits on real property in the district.8 "
Municipal corporations are required to create a district if re-
quested to under the Municipal Property Owner's Improvement Dis-
trict Law.81 If land is owned by twenty-five or fewer persons and all
owners petition for creation of a district covering their land, the munic-
ipal corporation is required to create the district and appoint as a board
of commissioners the three individuals whose names are in the peti-
tion.82 The district may issue bonds payable from a tax levy8 3 appor-
tioned on the basis of assessed benefits on real property in the district.84
It is difficult to think of a more intrusive direct control by the legisla-
ture. The statute requires the municipality to create the district, even
though the district will be making significant utility improvements on
areas within the municipal corporation and burdening that property
with an additional tax.
Volumes 10, 1 1, and 12 of the Arkansas Code Annotated are filled
with variations of the types of districts that can be created, each having
its own governing body, and each having the ability to incur indebted-
ness and either levy taxes or assess benefits to repay that indebtedness.
One must assume that the general assembly rarely meets a special pur-
pose district that it does not like.
5. Municipal Corporations and the Power to Tax
The 1874 constitution has been the principal limitation on the
amount that municipal corporations and counties may raise from the
property tax; the general assembly has limited the amounts that may
be raised from sales and use taxes. Close control on the amount of
taxes levied for very specific purposes tilts the balance away from local
power in favor of state power over municipal corporations. Moreover,
the use of constitutional limitations on rates of taxation requires
77. Id. § 14-92-205.
78. Id. § 14-92-210.
79. Id. § 14-92-234.
80. Id. §§ 14-92-228, -235 (Michie 1987 & Supp. 1991).
81. Id. §§ 14-94-101 to -128 (Michie Supp. 1991).
82. Id. § 14-94-106.
83. Id. § 14-94-123.
84. Id. § 14-94-118.
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amendment of the constitution to respond to changing conditions. The
history of amendments to article XIV, section 3 of the Arkansas Con-
stitution of 1874 demonstrates the problem with specific limitations. As
originally enacted, article XIV, section 3 provided (1) that the general
assembly could levy a tax not to exceed two mills per dollar on taxable
property for the support of the common schools and (2) that the gen-
eral assembly could authorize school districts to levy, subject to voter
approval, a tax not to exceed five mills per dollar for school purposes.
85
In 1906, the section was amended to authorize a state tax not exceed-
ing three mills and a district tax not exceeding seven mills. 8 Ten years
later the section was once again amended, raising the maximum au-
thorized district tax to twelve mills.8 7 Amendment 11, adopted in 1926,
authorized a maximum district tax of eighteen mills.88 In the twenty
year period from 1906 to 1926, this one constitutional provision was
amended three times. But that was not the last amendment. Amend-
ment 40, adopted in 1948, deleted authority for a state property tax for
school purposes and deleted the maximum rate that a district could
levy. 89 Article XIV, section 3 now provides that the maximum rate of
tax a school district may levy is that approved by the voters in the
district.9" Including the original version of article XIV, section 3, it
took five different provisions in a period of seventy-four years to enact a
limitation that allows a local decision on what rate of property taxes
will be imposed to support public schools in the area.
The situation for municipal corporations is more complicated. Not
only are there maximum rates of tax; there are different rates depend-
ing on the purpose for which the levy is made. Once again, the starting
point is article XII, section 4 of the 1874 constitution, which limits
property taxes levied by municipal corporations to five mills on the dol-
lar of assessed value.91 That levy is for any lawful purpose; there are
additional specific levies authorized. Arkansas Constitution Amend-
ment 18 authorizes certain cities of the first class to levy, upon voter
approval, an additional five mills for the purpose of "securing the loca-
tion of factories, industries, river transportation and facilities therefor





90. ARK. CONST. art. XIV, § 3.
91. Id. art. XlI, § 4.
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within and adjacent to such cities . ,". Arkansas Constitution
Amendment 30 authorizes a city, with voter approval, to levy an addi-
tional one mill for the purpose of maintaining a public library. 3 The
amendment was adopted in 1940; fifty-two years later, the people of
Arkansas determined it was necessary to increase the maximum rate
and approved an amendment on November 3, 1992, raising the maxi-
mum rate to five mills on the dollar.94 Arkansas Constitution Amend-
ment 31 authorizes a city, with voter approval, to levy an additional
two mills to fund a retirement account for policemen and firemen.9 5
Arkansas Constitution Amendment 62, section 1 authorizes municipal
corporations, with voter approval, to issue capital improvement bonds
payable from a tax on real or personal property. Rather than stating a
maximum tax rate, the provision limits the total amount of bonds that
can be issued and outstanding at any one time to twenty percent of the
total assessed value of real and personal property in the issuing
municipality. 96
The general assembly has followed a similar pattern when author-
izing municipal corporations to impose sales and use taxes. Legislation
authorizes multiple taxes for particular uses. A municipal corporation,
with voter approval, may levy a sales and use tax of 0.25%, 0.5%,
0.75 %, or 1% .11 The tax revenues raised may be used "for any purpose
for which the city's general funds may be used."98 Municipal corpora-
tions may also levy, with voter approval, a sales and use tax for not
more than a two year period at a rate of either 0.5 % or I % to provide
"funds for the acquisition, construction, or improvement of parks and
recreation facilities within the city or town." 99
The general assembly has shown itself more than willing to fine
tune a tax authorization:
Any city of the first or second class having a population of not
more than forty thousand (40,000) persons according to the most re-
cent federal census and which has been or may hereafter be desig-
nated as a model city under the Demonstration Cities and Metropoli-
92. Id. amend. XVii1.
93. Id. amend. XXX.
94. Kevin Walker, Voters Approve Amendment to let Libraries Ask for up to 8 Mills, ARK.
DEMOCRAT GAZETTE, Nov. 4, 1992, at DI.
95. ARK. CONST. amend. XXXI.
96. Id. amend. LXII, § I.
97. ARK. CODE ANN. § 26-75-207 (Michie Supp. 1991).
98. Id. § 26-75-217 (Michie 1987).
99. Id. § 26-75-403.
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tan Development Act of 1966 may ... levy for the benefit of the city
a tax of not to exceed one percent (1 %) on gross proceeds or gross
receipts derived from sales within the city . ... '00
Any city of the first class may ... levy a tax of one percent (1 %)
upon the gross receipts or gross proceeds from the renting . .. of hotel
or motel accommodations . . . or upon the gross receipts or gross pro-
ceeds of . . . establishments . . . engaged in the business of selling
prepared food . .. .10
If the city happens to have a national park located in it, the tax may
equal three percent; 102 if the city happens to have a designated historic
district and is included in the National Register of Historic Places, the
tax may equal two percent. 10 3 Each tax levy requires voter approval.10
There are other examples of specific taxes authorizing levies by
both municipal corporations and counties. The above are illustrative
only; they are pointed out because they so graphically illustrate the
need to reform the approach to tax authorization in the State of
Arkansas.105
6. Summary
Perhaps none of this maneuvering would matter if it came at no
cost - but there are costs. To the extent that debt limitations are
meant to control the financial burden that a municipal corporation can
impose on its residents, they fail. To the extent we rely on citizen
knowledge of the abilities of and limitations on a municipal corporation
to address problems, the complexity forced on the local government to
comply creatively with constitutional strictures frustrates the ability of
a citizen to be informed and involved. To the extent that financial
transactions are structured based on the necessity of complying with
the state constitutional limitations rather than on the most efficient
(read that least expensive) method of raising the necessary capital, the
debt limitations actually harm the citizen rather than protect her."0 '
100. Id. § 26-75-502.
101. Id. § 26-75-602(a)(1)(A) (Michie Supp. 1991).
102. Id. § 26-75-602(a)(l)(B).
103. Id. § 26-75-602(a)(1)(C).
104. Id. § 26-75-602(a)(2).
105. See infra notes 263-69 and accompanying text.
106. See, e.g., Kenneth W. Hollman & Walter J. Primeaux, Jr., An Examination of Debt
Ceilings as Barriers to Efficient Debt Management, 25 ALA. L. REV. 417 (1973); Harold Wolman
& George Peterson, State and Local Government Strategies for Responding to Fiscal Pressure,
55 TUL. L. REV. 773 (1981).
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Should the reader have any doubt that the possibilities of incur-
ring constitutional indebtedness, both with and without voter approval,
are myriad and complex, consider the following list which is illustrative
only, not exhaustive:
1. special assessment to pay for street improvements;
10 7
2. the Recreation Facilities Bond Act;10 8
3. issuance of revenue bonds for solid waste facilities;109
4. bonds for construction of pollution control facilities; 10
5. bonds issued by sanitation authorities pursuant to the Joint
County and Municipal Solid Waste Disposal Act;
6. bonds for airports;" 2
7. bonds for municipal or county jails;" 3
8. bonds for electric power generation;""
9. bonds for waterworks;" 5
10. bonds for sewer systems;"
11. bonds for natural gas systems;"'
12. capital improvement bonds authorized by Amendment 62 and
bonds issued pursuant to the Local Government Bond Act of 1985
(adopted under Amendment 62); " 8
13. public corporation for public facility bonds;" 9
14. bonds issued pursuant to the Public Facilities Boards Act; 20
15. bonds issued under the Municipalities and Counties Industrial
Development Revenue Bond Law;1 2'
16. bonds issued under the Municipal Street and Parking Revenue
Bond Act; 22 and
17. bonds issued under the Public Transit System Act.'2 3
107. ARK. CODE ANN. § 14-301-204 (Michie 1987).
108. Id. § 14-269-105.
109. Id. § 14-232-104.
110. Id. § 14-267-106.
111. Id. § 14-233-109.
112. Id. § 14-360-306.
113. Id. § 12-41-705.
114. Id. § 14-202-108.
115. Id. § 14-234-205.
116. Id. § 14-235-215 (Michie Supp. 1991).
117. Id. § 14-205-102 (Michie 1987).
118. Id. § 14-164-308.
119. Id. § 14-138-114.
120. Id. § 14-137-116 (Michie Supp. 1991).
121. Id. § 14-164-206 (Michie 1987).
122. Id. § 14-302-106.
123. Id. § 14-334-109.
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The variations possible illustrate the dual nature of the problem. The
state is managing municipal indebtedness rather than providing general
authority subject to generally applicable limitations; the citizen of the
municipal corporation faces a daunting task in acting in an informed
way.
III. PROTECTING LOCAL POWER
We now must consider the role of the constitution in protecting
local power. To say that the municipal corporation is subject to the
legislature proves too much. The legislative control of municipal corpo-
rations is limited by the provisions of the state constitution. As previ-
ously noted, a state constitution is not a grant of power, it is a limita-
tion on the power the sovereign may exercise over its citizens.12' By
adopting a state constitution and by amending an existing state consti-
tution, the citizens of the state have the ability to direct the legislature
how to act with respect to questions of municipal corporations. That
ability includes prohibiting the legislature from interfering with munic-
ipal corporations. Constitutional provisions can even directly authorize
and empower municipal corporations.125
A. Local and Special Laws
Amendment 14 of the 1874 constitution contains a direct limita-
tion on the power of the legislature to control municipal corporations:
"The General Assembly shall not pass any local or special act. This
amendment shall not prohibit the repeal of local or special acts." 126 A
legislature, unless prohibited by a constitutional limitation, has the au-
thority to enact legislation that deals specifically with the internal af-
fairs of a particular municipal corporation. 127 Voters in Arkansas de-
nied the legislature that power by enacting Amendment 14. But as is
often the case, what appears as an absolute prohibition to any local
"meddling" is not. In interpreting the phrase "local or special act," the
court has held that
[a] law is special in a constitutional sense when by force of an inher-
ent limitation it arbitrarily separates some person, place or thing from
those upon which, but for such separation it would operate and a local
124. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
125. See, e.g., ARK. CONST. amend. LXII, § 7.
126. ARK. CONST. amend. XIV.
127. See I CHESTER J. ANTIEAU, MUNICIPAL CORPORATION LAW § 2.00 (1992).
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law is one that applies to any subdivision or division of the state less
than the whole.' 28
Acts that apply only to certain classifications of municipal corpora-
tions '2 or to municipal corporations based on the population of the en-
tity '3 have been upheld as having a rational basis rather than being
based on an arbitrary separation.' 1
Protection from direct interference afforded by Amendment 14
does strengthen the power enjoyed by a municipal corporation. But a
more effective protection for local government can be found in a grant
of home rule authority.
B. Home Rule Authority
Municipal home rule does not exist as a matter of right; to argue
that it does would require adopting the theory of an inherent right to
local self-government. Rather, home rule authority is granted to a mu-
nicipal corporation by one of two sources. For a municipal corporation
to exercise powers denominated as "home rule," there must be either a
constitutional grant of home rule authority ("constitutional") or a stat-
utory grant of home rule authority ("statutory"). The state constitution
acts as a limitation on the sovereign power; 132 thus, a direct grant of
home rule authority to municipal corporations in a state constitution
prevents the legislature from denying its exercise. The absence of a
constitutional grant, coupled with the right of the legislature to control
the powers that may be exercised by a municipal corporation, leaves a
statutory authorization of home rule as the other source of the right.
Missouri is credited as the first state to give its municipal corpora-
tions home rule authority by adoption of an amendment to its constitu-
tion in 1875.11 From that start, variations on the extent of home rule
authority and the exercise of that authority have multiplied." The
source of the home rule authority grant - constitutional or statutory
- has not proved to be significant in determining the scope of the
power granted. 35 Of course, if the grant is statutory, it may be re-
128. Laman v. Harrill, 233 Ark. 967, 970, 349 S.W.2d 814, 816 (1961).
129. Whittaker v. Carter, 238 Ark. 1074, 386 S.W.2d 498 (1965).
130. Murphy v. Cook, 202 Ark. 1069, 155 S.W.2d 330 (1941).
131. Whittaker, 238 Ark. 1074, 386 S.W.2d 498; Murphy, 202 Ark. 1069, 155 S.W.2d 330.
132. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
133. 1 ANT]EAU, supra note 127, § 3.00.
134. See, e.g., I ANTIEAU, supra note 127, §§ 3.01, 3.03, 3.08, 3.10.
135. See Kenneth E. Vanlandingham, Municipal Home Rule in the United States, 10 WM.
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pealed by the legislature. The nature or type of the grant has proved to
be the more significant factor in the importance of home rule to a mu-
nicipal corporation.
Home rule is a means of allocating power between the state and a
municipal corporation. Two types of home rule authority have devel-
oped. If the home rule unit is given power over local matters to the
exclusion of the state, the authority is described as "imperium in im-
perio" - a state within a state.1 s6 The municipal corporation, as to
local matters, can act notwithstanding the provisions of state law (other
than the state constitution). But if the municipal corporation only has
authority to act to the extent not limited by state law, it is said that the
corporation enjoys legislative home rule.13 7 Under imperio home rule,
arguments about the exercise of power by a municipal corporation fo-
cus on the question of what constitutes a local matter or affair because
the imperio home rule power of the municipal corporation prevents
state intervention if the exercise of authority is with respect to a local
matter. 3 8 Under legislative home rule, the question to be answered
when exercise of authority by a municipal corporation is challenged is
whether any state law directly or indirectly prohibits the exercise of
power with respect to the subject matter by the municipal
corporation.139
C. Home Rule in Arkansas
The Arkansas constitution contains no provision granting home
rule authority to municipal corporations. Home rule in Arkansas is
therefor necessarily a statutory grant of power. Not only is there no
constitutional provision making a direct grant of home rule power to
municipal corporations, the first clause of article XII, section 4 of the
Arkansas Constitution of 1874 provides that "[n]o municipal corpora-
tion shall be authorized to pass any law contrary to the general laws of
the state." 1 0 Home rule in Arkansas is, therefore, necessarily
legislative.
An Arkansas city of the second class may exercise legislative home
& MARY L. REV. 269, 277, 282-83, 294-96 (1968).
136. See City of St. Louis v. Western Union Tel. Co., 149 U.S. 465, 468 (1893); C. DALLAS
SANDS & MICHAEL E. LIBONATI, I LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW § 4.01 (1992).
137. SANDS & LIBONATI, supra note 136, § 4.05.
138. SANDS & LIBONATI, supra note 136, § 4.06.
139. SANDS & LIBONATI, supra note 136, § 4.06.
140. Ark. Const. art. XI1, § 4.
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rule if it has adopted a charter."' Arkansas cities of the first class have
legislative home rule even without the adoption of a city charter,1 42 but
also have a cumulative grant of authority to exercise legislative home
rule if a charter has been adopted.
14 3
The grant of authority to first class cities is stated very broadly:
"Any city of the first class is authorized to perform any function and
exercise full legislative power in any and all matters of whatsoever na-
ture pertaining to its municipal affairs including, but not limited to, the
power to tax."14 ' But what the legislature gives, the legislature may
take away - and it did. "'Municipal affairs' means all matters and
affairs of government germane to, affecting, or concerning the munici-
pality or its government, except the following, which are state affairs
and subject to the general laws of the State of Arkansas";1 45 a list of
fifteen exclusions from "municipal affairs" follows. Some of the exclu-
sions from municipal affairs are readily justified. State control of "the
construction and maintenance of state highways,"1 4 "incorporation...
of municipalities and annexation of territory thereto, 1 47 and "matters
coming within the police power of the state including minimum public
health, pollution, and safety standards"'' 48 all relate more to exercise of
state sovereignty than to a question of local concern. 1 9 But other ex-
ceptions are not so easily justified as being a state concern rather than
a municipal affair. Questions regarding control of traffic on state high-
ways within municipal boundaries,' merger of municipal corpora-
tions,' 5 ' collective bargaining,151 pension and civil service systems,
53
and hours and vacations, holidays, and other fringe benefits of employ-
ees154 are all removed from the scope of municipal affairs. Even though
the municipal corporation "may exercise any function or legislative
power upon [the enumerated] state affairs not in conflict with state
141. ARK. CODE. ANN. §§ 14-42-302, -307 (Michie 1987).
142. Id. §§ 14-43-601, -602.
143. id. §§ 14-42-302, -307.
144. Id. § 14-43-602.
145. Id. § 14-43-601(a)(1) (emphasis added).
146. Id. § 14-43-601(a)(1)(L).
147. Id. § 14-43-601(a)(l)(N).
148. Id. § 14-43-601(a)(1)(J).
149. See infra notes 230-48 and accompanying text.
150. ARK. CODE ANN. § 14-43-601(a)(1)(L) (Michie 1987).
151. Id. § 14-43-601(a)(1)(N).
152. Id. § 14-43-601(a)(1)(E).
153. Id. § 14-43-601(a)(1)(F).
154. Id. § 14-43-601(a)(l)(G).
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law, '155 the reservation of state control on these matters limits the abil-
ity of the municipal corporation to make meaningful decisions for the
welfare of its residents.
The inclusion of the power to tax within the ambit of municipal
affairs 15 also appears to be a generous grant of power by the legisla-
ture. Once again, the appearance is deceptive. Only sales, gross re-
ceipts, gross proceeds, use, payroll, and income taxes authorized by law
may be levied by the municipal corporation; 57 only taxes authorized by
law may be levied on alcoholic beverages.
58
The search for home rule authority with respect to taxes is not
over, however. The legislature has granted any county or municipality
authority to "levy any tax not otherwise prohibited by law.' 59 Once
again, this broad grant is immediately restricted. Only taxes authorized
by law may be imposed on fuel, tobacco, or alcoholic beverages;160 no
new sales or use taxes may be levied until authorized by the general
assembly;' 6 ' and any new levy, including of any income tax, must be
approved by the voters of the political subdivision.' The most obvious
and lucrative forms of taxation are removed from control of the munic-
ipal corporation and county.
The home rule powers of counties must be considered, particularly
since much of Arkansas is rural in nature and lacks urban areas which
are most likely to exercise home rule authority over an extensive geo-
graphic area. Counties enjoy legislative home rule authority as the re-
sult of a constitutional grant. The source of the right to exercise home
rule authority is Amendment 55 to the Arkansas Constitution of 1874:
"A county acting through its Quorum Court may exercise local legisla-
tive authority not denied by the Constitution or by law."' 3 Because the
county may only exercise local legislative authority not denied by law,
its powers are subject to control by the general assembly. Thus, coun-
ties possess legislative home rule authority with a constitutional source.
Numerous restrictions on the exercise of local legislative authority have
155. Id. § 14-43-601(a)(2).
156. Id. § 14-43-602.
157. Id. § 14-43-606(a).
158. Id. § 14-43-606(b).
159. Id. § 26-73-103(a).
160. Id. § 26-73-103(b).
161. Id. § 26-73-103(g).
162. Id. § 26-73-103(a).
163. ARK. CONST. amend. LV, § 1(a) (emphasis added).
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been enacted.16 Coupled with the limitation on the power to tax found
in Arkansas Code Annotated section 26-73-103, these limitations re-
duce the significance of the home rule grant.
IV. DETERMINING THE PROPER POWER ALLOCATION BETWEEN A
STATE AND ITS MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS
A review of the structural protection afforded to a municipal cor-
poration by the federal and state constitutions is necessary before con-
sidering whether municipal corporations should be strengthened vis 'a
vis the state. The Federal Constitution offers a municipal corporation
very little protection from its state, as the United States Supreme
Court made clear in 1907 in Hunter v. City of Pittsburgh:'65
Municipal corporations are political subdivisions of the State,
created as convenient agencies for exercising such of the governmental
powers of the State as may be entrusted to them .... Neither their
charters, nor any law conferring governmental powers ... constitutes
a contract within the State within the meaning of the Federal Consti-
tution. The State, therefore, at its pleasure may modify or withdraw
all such powers, may take without compensation such property, ...
expand or contract the territorial area, . . . repeal the charter and
destroy the corporation. All this may be done, conditionally or uncon-
ditionally, with or without the consent of the citizens, or even against
their protest. In all these respects the State is supreme, and its legisla-
tive body, conforming its action to the state constitution, may do as it
will, unrestrained by the Constitution of the United States .... [The
inhabitants] have no right by contract or otherwise in the unaltered or
continued existence of the corporation or its powers .... The power is
in the State and those who legislate for the State are alone responsible
for any unjust or oppressive exercise of it.1ee
One can quite reasonably conclude, after reading the decision in
Hunter, that a municipal corporation is subject to the whims of the
state. But in Hunter, the Court indicated that its unrestricted pro-
nouncement of the absolute nature of state power over the state's mu-
nicipal corporations might not apply to property held in the corpora-
tion's proprietary capacity rather than in its governmental capacity. 6
Furthermore, the Court was addressing what the state can do without
164. See ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 14-14-801, -805 to -809 (Michie 1987).
165. 207 U.S. 161 (1907).




violating the United States Constitution, and specifically recognized
that the state's own constitution can in fact limit the seemingly abso-
lute state control over its municipal corporations. Two state constitu-
tional protections of municipal corporate power have already been iden-
tified: prohibitions against local legislation l"8 and constitutional grants
of home rule authority.16 9 The Arkansas constitutional provision
against local legislation, when read in conjunction with the provisions
relating to organization of municipal corporations, provides a modicum
of protection for an existing municipal corporation.
Amendment 14 denies the general assembly the power to enact
local or special acts. 170 "[A] local law is one that applies to any subdi-
vision or division of the state less than the whole." 171 Article XII, sec-
tion 2 of the 1874 constitution denies the general assembly the power
to "pass [a] special act conferring corporate powers ... where the cor-
porations created are to be and remain under the patronage and control
of the state.' 72 So how is the general assembly to provide for munici-
pal corporations? Article XII, section 3 mandates that the "General
Assembly shall provide, by general laws, for the organization of cities
(which may be classified) and incorporated towns, and restrict their
power of taxation, assessment, borrowing money and contracting debts,
so as to prevent the abuse of such power."'' 73 When read together, the
three provisions of the 1874 constitution offer some protection against a
particular municipality being singled out by the legislature. The Ar-
kansas Supreme Court very early held that an attempt by the legisla-
ture to vary the territory of a city by direct action was unconstitu-
tional .17 Likewise, the court voided as unconstitutional legislation that
attempted to change Benton, Arkansas, from an incorporated town to a
city of the second class.' 76 Do not make too much of the protection
offered, however. Given that under Arkansas law a special act is one
that arbitrarily separates municipal corporations,17 6 and considering
that legislation based on population brackets has been held constitu-
168. ARK. CONST. amend. XIV. See supra notes 126-31 and accompanying text.
169. See supra notes 132-39 and accompanying text.
170. See ARK. CONST. amend. XIV; see supra notes 126-31 and accompanying text.
171. Laman v. Harrill, 233 Ark. 967, 970, 349 SW.2d 814, 816 (1961).
172. ARK. CONST. art. XII, § 2.
173. Id. § 3.
174. City of Little Rock v. Parish, 36 Ark. 166 (1880).
175. Cotten v. City of Benton, 117 Ark. 190, 174 S.W. 231 (1915).
176. Laman v. Harrill, 233 Ark. 967, 349 S.W.2d 814 (1961).
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tional,1" the legislature certainly can target particular municipalities if
it desires. Constitutional home rule that incorporates legislative home
rule authority with limitations on legislative discretion offers the best
hope of strengthening municipal corporations in Arkansas, if in fact
that is desired. 178 That issue must now be resolved.
A. Theories of Localism
The challenge to reconsider the role of the municipal corporation
in American society was made eloquently by Gerald Frug in his 1980
article, The City as a Legal Concept. ' 9 Frug challenged us to rethink
radically the role of the city in modern society.180 Frug argues that
American cities are powerless;1 81 that they are powerless because of
legal doctrine;"' and that because the city is powerless, individuals
choose not to participate in the political life of the city because it
makes no difference:
1 83
Cities as they currently exist should not simply be made more power-
ful. Rather, the argument for city power rests on what cities have
177. See, e.g., Lovell v. Democratic Cent. Comm., 230 Ark. 811, 327 S.W.2d 387 (1959)
(holding that an act relating to the election of municipal officials in cities of the first class which
are organized under the mayor-council form of government and have a population of more than
50,000 is not a special or local act, notwithstanding that at the time of adoption it applied to only
one city); Whittaker v. Carter, 238 Ark. 1074, 386 S.W.2d 498 (1965) (holding that an act appli-
cable to all cities which now or in the future operate under the commission form of government is
not a special or local act); cf. Laman v. Harrill, 233 Ark. 967, 349 S.W.2d 814 (1961) (finding
statute, which applies to cities which have a population of 20,000 or more and are located in
counties wih a population of 100,000 or more, is void as special or local act); Burrow v. Jolly, 207
Ark. 515, 181 S.W.2d 479 (Ark. 1944) (finding statute, which applies only to counties which have
a population between 18,300 and 18,350, is void as special or local act).
178. See infra notes 237-48 and accompanying text.
179. Frug, supra note 36.
180. Frug's use of the term "city" is very inclusive. Acknowledging that for some neighbor-
hood power is the touchstone, while for others regional government is the touchstone, he includes
both or either as the reader pleases. Frug, supra note 36, at 1061-62. Because Frug does not
worry about whether the "city" to which he refers is a neighborhood of 100 people or a regional
government including 8,000,000 people, his argument for increasing municipal power as a means
of enhancing the role of the individual in a participatory democracy is difficult to accept. See infra
notes 206-10 and accompanying text.
181. Frug, supra note 36, at 1059.
182. Frug, supra note 36, at 1060.
183. "No one is likely to participate in the decisionmaking of an entity of any size unless
that participation will make a difference in his life. Power and participation are inextricably
linked: a sense of powerlessness tends to produce apathy rather than participation, while the exis-
tence of power encourages those able to participate in its exercise to do so." Frug, supra note 36,
at 1070.
UALR LAW JOURNAL
been and what they could become. Cities have served ' 4 - and might
again serve - as vehicles to achieve purposes which have been frus-
trated in modern American life. They could respond to ... the need..
[and] ability to participate actively in the basic societal decisions
that affect one's life. This conception of freedom - a positive activity
designed to create one's way of life - differs markedly from the cur-
rently popular idea of freedom as merely "an inner realm into which
men might escape at will from the pressures of the world."' 85
Frug argues that if all that is wanted is a resolution of the current
problems faced by cities - improvement of the quality of life of those
in our major cities, encouragement of urbanization for protection of the
environment, continuation of cities as trade or cultural centers -
rather than increasing city power, local autonomy should be limited or
even prohibited all together.' 86 Cities "administered by federal officials
authorized to implement a national urban policy" might more quickly
and efficiently solve such problems. 87
While Frug argues for a rethinking and restructuring of state and
local power as a method for increasing participation in public life by all
citizens, economic efficiency arguments for shifting the balance toward
the municipal corporation have also been made. Perhaps the best eco-
nomic analysis for increased local power was made by Charles Tiebout
in his 1956 article, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures. 8 8 Tiebout
viewed citizens as consumers. The consumer will look for value - the
mix between services desired and the price she is willing to pay that
comes closest to meeting the consumer's desires.1 89 The citizen has two
options in searching for that mix which is most satisfactory. She may
exercise the power to vote (referred to as her "voice"); if that does not
achieve what she wants, she can move to a municipality that more
closely maximizes value from her perspective (referred to as "exit"). 90
Each of these options has ramifications for a municipal corporation and
its residents. For voice to be effective, the political unit must be a size
184. Frug is referring to the medieval town when he talks of cities at one time serving as an
intermediary between the state and the individual. Frug, supra note 36, at 1083-90.
185. Frug, supra note 36, at 1068.
186. Frug, supra note 36, at 1067.
187. Frug, supra note 36, at 1067.
188. Charles Tiebout, Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. POL. EcON. 416 (1956).
189. Id. at 418.
190. GORDON L. CLARK, JUDGES AND THE CITIES 75-77 (1985); Tiebout, supra note 188, at
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that makes participation in the political process meaningful. 19' Thus,
while many decry the multitude of political subdivisions as ineffi-
cient,1 92 the economic efficiency argument requires that municipal cor-
porations be small enough to encourage an effective voice for its resi-
dents. And for exit to be a viable choice for the unsatisfied citizen/
consumer, there must be a number of nearby municipal corporations
that can compete for the loyalty of the resident desiring to exit.19 3
This ability of an unsatisfied consumer of municipal services to
exit underscores the need for municipal power. To avoid losing resi-
dents and tax base, the municipal corporation must have the ability to
respond to the demands of its citizens with respect to their desired mix
of cost and service.'94 Only by having local autonomy on questions of
what services should be offered and how those services would be funded
can the municipality protect itself from a loss of citizens, businesses,
and inevitably tax base to fund the choices of those who have
remained.1
9 5
Troubling aspects of both Frug's and the economists' arguments
for enhanced local power at the expense of the state have been noted,
particularly by Richard Briffault in his 1990 article, Our Localism:
Part H - Localism and Legal Theory. 96 Briffault does not defend the
status quo; rather, he criticizes "the dominant contemporary theories of
localism . . . as a first step in moving local government law beyond
localism and toward a less abstract attention to particular substantive
problems and policies.'
97
The starting point for Frug is the powerlessness of our modern
cities. 198 Briffault points out - quite correctly - that in fact our mod-
ern cities are not powerless in the ways that Frug suggests.' 9 9 Special
acts and local legislation are prohibited. 20 0 Day-to-day decisions are
made at the local level because of practical necessity. Legislatures have
delegated broad powers to municipal governments.20 It simply is not
191. Frug, supra note 36, at 1068; cf. Tiebout, supra note 188, at 417.
192. See OSBORNE M. REYNOLDS, JR., LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW § 17 (1982).
193. Tiebout, supra note 188, at 419.
194. Richard Briffault, Our Localism: Part !! - Localism and Legal Theory, 90 COLUM.
L. REV. 346, 401 (1990).
195. Id. at 400-01.
196. Briffault, supra note 194.
197. Briffault, supra note 194, at 454.
198. Frug, supra note 36, at 1059.
199. Briffault, supra note 194, at 405-06.
200. See supra notes 126-31 and accompanying text.
201. See I ANTIEAU, supra note 127, at §§ 5.02-.03.
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correct that our cities are powerless. Questions of actual services that
will be provided, the level of funding for those services, and, to a lesser
extent, the source of revenues for that funding, are left to the discretion
of the municipal corporation within state constitutional constraints.
20 2
Briffault suggests that Frug actually favors reshaping the munici-
pal corporation to include powers currently exercised by private corpo-
rations as a means of achieving social justice in addition to providing
citizens a meaningful voice.20 3 It requires reading City as Legal Con-
cept to fully understand the accuracy of Briffault's assessment of
Frug's implicit goal. But Briffault makes a strong summary argument
for his interpretation of Frug:
Although Frug puts the case for participation primarily in terms
of the psychological and emotional benefits of individual involvement
in political life, latent in his theory is the assumption that city power
will somehow transform local politics in the direction of greater social
justice. His specific proposals - that cities operate banks, insurance
companies and other financial institutions, provide housing, create
food cooperatives and run profit-making businesses [citation omitted]
- reflect the idea that such municipal activity would radically trans-
form local political life and provide a basis for empowering workers,
the poor and consumers .... In short, Frug suggests, greater individ-
ual participation in urban government would lead to more redistribu-
tive local governments.
14
Briffault then turns to economic theory. He uses Tiebout's model
to demonstrate that cities avoid redistributive policies not because the
cities are powerless, but rather because shifting wealth might cause
wealthy citizens to exit. 2 5 Any reader who has relocated knows that
mobility requires money. Consideration must be given to the availabil-
ity of transportation, to the question of closeness of schools if there are
children, and to the affordability of housing in the particular municipal
corporation. The renter must have time free from work to locate a new
residence. The home owner must have a market for her existing home
and be able to cover the costs of selling one house (close to ten percent
of the selling price) and purchasing another (typically, a down payment
of a percentage of the purchase price plus an additional two to three
percent of the purchase price to cover closing costs). After finding a
202. See supra notes 47-123 and accompanying text.
203. Briffault, supra note 194, at 407.
204. Briffault, supra note 194, at 407.
205. Briffault, supra note 194, at 408.
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suitable place, the mover must have money to cover security deposits,
utility connections and deposits, and the move of personal possessions.
Time free from work must be available for the actual move. Who is
more likely to actually have the option of exit? The wealthier individ-
ual or family does, as many of the requirements for exit are financial.
It is to that citizen that a municipal corporation must provide value, for
it is that citizen (whether an individual or business) who enjoys the
option of exit.
Briffault's concern with multiple powerful municipal corporations
does not rely solely on the lack of a true choice for exit by most citi-
zens. As noted, Frug seeks to increase individual voice through mean-
ingful participation. 00 Relying on Madisonian arguments, Briffault
suggests that the opposite result is as, or even more, probable. As local
governments are reduced in population and granted greater autonomy
from state control, a majority will be more easily formed. That major-
ity will be able to impose its desires for the exercise of power to the
detriment of the minority of the community.20 7 Madison, in The Feder-
alist No. 10, expressed his concern of majority oppression as the possi-
bility of faction:
By a faction I understand a number of citizens, whether amount-
ing to a majority or minority of the whole, who are united and actu-
ated by some common impulse of passion, or of interest, adverse to
the rights of other citizens, or to the permanent and aggregate inter-
ests of the community .... The smaller the society, the fewer proba-
bly will be the distinct parties and interests composing it; the fewer
the distinct parties and interests, the more frequently will a majority
be found of the same party; and the smaller the number of individuals
composing a majority ... the more easily will they concert and exe-
cute their plans of oppression. Extend the sphere, and you take in a
greater variety of parties and interests; you make it less probable that
a majority of the whole will have a common motive to invade the
rights of other citizens; or if such a common motive exists, it will be
more difficult for all who feel it to discover their own strength, and to
act in unison with each other.2 08
Provisions of the Arkansas Constitution reflect this Madisonian fear. It
is present in (1) the requirement that the legislature restrict municipal
corporations' "power of taxation, assessment, borrowing money and
206. See supra notes 183-85 and accompanying text.
207. Briffault, supra note 194, at 404.
208. THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 63-64 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961).
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contracting debts' 209 and (2) the denial to the legislature of authority
to authorize any municipal corporation "to pass any law contrary to the
general laws of the state.1210 It is of course true that each of these
provisions serves other purposes at the same time. For instance, fiscally
irresponsible actions by one municipal corporation can harm other Ar-
kansas municipalities in the capital-raising markets. The state thus has
a legitimate interest in protecting itself and its political subdivisions
from the folly of a particular municipal corporation. These provisions
do, however, leave no doubt that the larger body politic - the state -
is to protect individuals from oppressive decisions of a much smaller
body politic. In Madisonian terms, the state will protect the minority
from a majority faction in a small segment of society.
Briffault identified another danger in a major shift of power to
municipalities. The non-Madisonian concern that justifies the legisla-
tive control over municipal corporations specified in article XII, section
3 is one example.21" ' Namely, cities and towns both act and fail to act
in ways that have an impact outside of their municipal boundaries.212
Putting this phenomenon in economic terms, some costs of a municipal-
ity's decisions are externalized. The costs associated with the benefits of
a particular course of action may not fall on the ones who are the prin-
cipal beneficiaries of the benefits. 3 The more numerous the units au-
tonomously exercising local power, the greater are the opportunities for
externalizing costs and the more likely externalization will occur as a
result of the smaller territorial area of the municipal corporation. In
fact Tiebout recognized this problem. Briffault notes that, according to
Tiebout, a municipality will have achieved an efficient structure "only
when locally supplied public services 'exhibit no external economies or
diseconomies between communities.' "214 Returning to his position that
Frug's underlying thesis is based on participatory democracy, Briffault
argues that the impact of municipal action on those outside of the mu-
nicipal corporation should trouble those arguing for such expansive lo-
cal autonomy. Non-residents, who have neither voice nor an option of
exit because they are not residents of the municipal corporation, have
209. ARK. CONST. art. Xll, § 3.
210. Id. § 4.
211. See supra note 209 and accompanying text.
212. Briffault, supra note 194, at 426.
213. ROBIN P. MALLOY. LAW AND ECONOMICS - A COMPARATIVE APPROACH TO THEORY
AND PRACTICE 34 (1990).
214. Briffault, supra note 194, at 426 (citing Tiebout, supra note 188, at 419).
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no say in decisions that affect their daily lives.2 15
Briffault concludes that "[r]ather than seeking a state-local rela-
tionship characterized by either complete state dominance or one of
complete local autonomy, elements of both perspectives should be com-
bined." 1 A structure that "combine[s] local initiative, participation
and voice with state financial support, state oversight and statewide
perspectives for evaluating local action" should be the goal.
21 7
One must only observe her own community to realize that Brif-
fault is correct in calling for local initiative combined with state over-
sight and financial support. Should we allow the City of Jacksonville to
determine whether hazardous wastes within its city limits will be de-
stroyed on site or simply moved outside its municipal boundary? Imag-
ine a system in which any political subdivision of the state could,
through exercise of its zoning and planning powers, exclude state penal
facilities, low and moderate income housing, landfills, or any other use
that the NIMBYs 15 found objectionable. When one realizes that coun-
ties in Arkansas cover 100% of the area of the state and can have
zoning and planning powers, one sees that the local government cannot
be paramount in all respects.
Frug was not arguing for such absolute supremacy, however. His
challenge to rethink the value of municipal corporations as a means of
liberty and freedom for the individual and society is useful. It never
hurts to be reminded that the status quo is not the only possible vision,
but that in fact improvements are usually possible.
B. Achieving Local Initiative with State Oversight
How are we to derive our structure for allocating,power between a
state and its municipal corporations? In his book Judges and the Cit-
ies,2' 19 Gordon Clark identifies four types of autonomy for a municipal
government:
1. initiative and immunity;
2. initiative and no immunity;
3. no initiative and immunity; and
4. no initiative and no immunity.
220
215. Briffault, supra note 194, at 426-27.
216. Briffault, supra note 194, at 453.
217. Briffault, supra note 194, at 453.
218. A person who says "Not in my back yard!"
219. CLARK, supra note 190.
220. CLARK, supra note 190, at 70.
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Initiative is the recognition of the right or power of a municipal corpo-
ration to act, including action that fundamentally restructures that mu-
nicipal corporation in a way that is not identifiable with its previous
structure or purpose. Immunity, from the perspective of the municipal-
ity, is its right to resist any effort by the state to interfere with the
municipality's initiative. The preceding discussion of City as Legal
Concept and Our Localism221 suggests that while none of these four
pairs strikes the proper balance alone, the use of all four approaches is
appropriate. In some arenas, municipal action should be protected from
state interference - the municipal corporation needs initiative and im-
munity. In others, while local government will have the right to initiate
action, the state will have the power to withdraw that right, even after
it has been exercised - initiative and no immunity. In some matters,
the municipal corporation should not have any right of initiative, nor
any protection from state control or review - no initiative and no im-
munity. And although it initially appears a meaningless category, there
are instances when the municipal corporation should not possess initia-
tive but should enjoy immunity. According to Clark's typology, situa-
.tions allowing for no initiative but for immunity still allow the exercise
of some discretion on the part of the local actor, with that exercise of
discretion not subject to review by the state.
The most important task remains. A decision must be made: of the
functions and powers that can conceivably be exercised by a municipal
government, which should be permitted and which of the four types of
local autonomy is appropriate for the exercise of that function or
power? The question is complicated because of the significant differ-
ences in population between the smallest and largest incorporated
towns and cities. The answer with respect to Little Rock is not necessa-
rily the answer with respect to Lake Village. The range of activities
two municipal corporations of such significantly differing populations
might wish to undertake is not the predominant consideration unless
the state will require a certain activity to be undertaken. So long as the
municipal corporation has discretion in choosing to undertake the ser-
vice, there is no need to treat Little Rock differently than Lake Village
unless there is a legitimate concern about the external impact of the
action and the size of the actor is relevant to that concern. Remember-
ing Madison's concern of factionalism - of a majority imposing its
best interest rather than the community's (whether that community
221. See supra notes 179-218 and accompanying text.
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happens to be citizens of the particular municipal corporation or the
citizens of Arkansas) - can also help determine whether there is a
need to treat municipalities of different size differently in the allocation
of any particular power.
In instances where the decision is made to give the municipal cor-
poration initiative and immunity, it can still be appropriate for the
state to enact legislation that serves as a default provision. By choosing
not to act, the municipal corporation can effectively legislate with re-
spect to a matter by allowing the state statute to be the governing law
in that municipality. This is nothing more than a recognition that the
approach to the law of private corporations makes sense with respect to
municipal corporations. One goal of a well-drafted business corporation
act is to provide a standard agreement that will meet the needs of a
substantial number of users of the corporate form.222 In this way,
transaction costs are minimized by allowing the adoption by default of
provisions of state law.223
A statement of the goals of these allocation decisions will instruct
us in making the necessary choices. The allocation choice should:
1. reject any notion that the sole function of the municipal corpo-
ration is to serve as a passive agent to enact and implement locally
state policy and initiatives. Innovative, constructive local action,
designed by those directly affected by both the problem or need and the
solution, should be encouraged; the goal should be a state/local part-
nership rather than a state/local competition; and
2. empower of the local resident by providing her a meaningful
opportunity to affect the community in which she lives.
In deciding what provisions are appropriate for inclusion in the
Arkansas Constitution, one must decide what areas of the allocation of
power should be addressed. In which areas is it important to identify
the initiative/immunity mix? The two goals identified above suggest
that the matters to be addressed in the sections of the state constitution
granting home rule authority or otherwise controlling municipal corpo-
rations are:
1. the form of government;
2. the source of funds, including borrowed funds;
3. the use of funds; and




4. citizen access to information.
The expansive scope of each of these categories will be illustrated in
the discussion of the proper allocation of power between the state and
municipal corporation.
C. A Proposal for Arkansas
Fortunately for the people of Arkansas, we need not "start at the
beginning" or invent the wheel. Substantial work has already been
done. Both the Proposed Arkansas Constitution of 1970 ("1970 Propo-
sal")22 and the Proposed Arkansas Constitution of 1980 ("1980 Propo-
sal")22 5 included provisions that would have fundamentally altered the
relationship between the state and its municipal corporations.22 6 As
previously noted, the provisions of the 1970 Proposal relating to the
organization, governmental structure, and powers of counties were sub-
stantially adopted and are currently in the 1874 constitution.227 Be-
cause the 1980 Proposal represents the more recent thinking by dele-
gates charged with the responsibility of reforming local government
structure, I will analyze the sections directly relevant to municipal cor-
porations and within the scope of coverage suggested by the initiative/
immunity typology of local autonomy228 to see how successfully they
would serve the two identified goals of the proposed restructuring.229
Section 10. Incorporation of Municipalities. The General Assem-
bly shall provide for the incorporation, merger, and organization of
municipalities, annexation of territory thereto, and uniform proce-
dures for the passage of ordinances by the governing bodies.
23 0
This section offers no right of initiative to a municipal corporation
and no immunity from state control with respect to the subjects cov-
ered. Two of the subjects are appropriate for no initiative/no immu-
224. Proposed ARK. CONST. of 1970, supra note 1.
225. Proposed ARK. CONST. of 1980, supra note 1.
226. Art. 6 of the Proposed Ark. Const. of 1970 contained provisions on incorporation of
municipalities (§ 10), home rule powers of municipalities (§ 12), limitations on municipal indebt-
edness (§ 14), and special districts (§ 17), among others. Sections 10-12, Art. 7 of the 1970
Proposed Constitution significantly revised the powers of municipalities. Proposed ARK. CONST. of
1970, supra note 1. For a discussion of the Proposed ARK. CoNsT. of 1980, see infra notes 230-74
and accompanying text.
227. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
228. See supra text between notes 223-24.
229. See supra text between notes 223-24.
230. Proposed ARK. CoNsT. of 1980 art. V1, § 10, supra note 1.
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nity; one matter is of such little concern for the municipal corporation
as to not be worth any worry. But two subjects are troublesome in their
inclusion in the no initiative/no immunity category.
Incorporation and annexation of territory are both subjects appro-
priately denied to municipal initiative. The state is the sovereign;2 31 no
argument has been made indicating that a group of citizens has the
right to form a municipal corporation against the wishes of the state. In
the same vein, inclusion of additional territory by annexation into an
existing municipal corporation has the effect of creating a municipal
corporation with respect to that territory, making it like the right to
control an initial incorporation.
There is an additional reason to have the state regulate annexa-
tion. Without state protection, neither the residents nor the property
owners included by annexation within a municipality will have any
voice with respect to the inclusion. The action will be taken by a politi-
cal subdivision in which they have no right to vote. The Madisonian
fear of one group acting for its own benefit without regard to the best
interest of the minority is justified in the annexation of territory on
local initiative.
Denial of initiative is not cost free to the municipal corporation,
however. Inability to expand municipal limits has been identified as a
major problem facing cities.2"2 The "shall provide . . . for the annexa-
tion of territory" must be construed as a mandatory obligation of the
general assembly; the legislature must enact enabling legislation pro-
viding for annexation. 3 3 This allocation of power illustrates how no ini-
tiative/no immunity actually leaves some discretion in the municipal
corporation. The municipal corporation will be denied authority to de-
termine the baseline requirements that must be met before an area can
be annexed. Those requirements will be enacted by the legislature. But
a city does not have to annex territory. It will exercise discretion in
deciding whether to expand its area. Once the city makes that decision,
231. See supra notes 17, 36-44 and accompanying text.
232. Laurie Reynolds, Rethinking Municipal Annexation Powers, 24 URB. LAw. 247, 250-
54 (1992); Patrick G. Cullen & Robert J. Noe, Stumbling Giants - A Path to Progress Through
Metropolitan Annexation, 39 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 56, 57 (1963-64).
233. Saying that the provision must be construed as mandatory may be meaningless. Courts
have generally been unwilling to claim any power to order a legislature to legislate pursuant to a
constitutional provision. If the legislature acts, its legislation must comply with the mandatory
provision. But if it refuses to enact any legislation with respect to the constitutional provision, a
court will not compel it to prepare and enact a bill. See Walter F. Dodd, Judicially Non-En-
forcible Provisions of Constitutions, 80 U. PA. L. REv. 54, 79-81 (1931).
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it will not have discretion with respect to the maximum area annexed
or the procedure to be followed. It must follow the general law of the
state. And the state, through its judicial branch, will have the right to
review the annexation to ensure that it satisfied the requirements of the
law.
Requiring a uniform procedure for the passage of ordinances by
governing bodies of municipalities, while arguably not appropriate for
inclusion in a no initiative/no immunity category, is not significant. To
the extent that a uniform requirement makes it more likely that a citi-
zen will have information,2 34 it enhances the citizen/consumer's voice
and is thus compatible with the identified goals. Possession of that in-
formation can also help citizens avoid majority exercise of power to the
detriment of the community as a whole or the minority.
Merger is not appropriate for denial of initiative. All area in the
resulting merged municipal corporation would have been in a municipal
corporation prior to the merger. There is no similarity to initial incor-
poration or annexation. State control of the procedure is not justified by
the goals of empowering citizens and protecting citizens from the
Madisonian faction. In fact, the drafters of the 1980 Proposal appar-
ently agreed. Article VI, section 11 provides that "[a]ny municipality
may consolidate with other municipalities, counties . . or other politi-
cal subdivisions . . . , upon approval of a majority of those voting on the
question in each affected area (emphasis added). ' ' 235 The provisions of
section 10 and section 11 with respect to merger conflict. Merger
should be removed from the coverage of section 10.
Organization of the municipal corporation is not appropriately
placed in the no initiative/no immunity category. The structure of the
local government is appropriately decided by those who will be subject
to its governance. Although it has been argued that the form selected
can have external effects,236 the potential impact external to the munic-
ipality is slight. The importance to those subjecting themselves to the
municipal corporation is significant, however. Initiative - local control
of organizational structure - for the citizens of the municipality is
234. Presumably any legislation enacted would require multiple readings of an ordinance.
This would increase the likelihood of citizens becoming aware of the proposed action. If any Ar-
kansas resident relocated to a different municipal corporation, she would already know its proce-
dure for enacting ordinances.
235. Proposed ARK. CONST. of 1980, supra note 1.
236. See Terrance Sandalow, The Limits of Municipal Power Under Home Rule: A Role




Section 12. Powers of Municipalities
(a) Legislative Power. A municipality may exercise any legisla-
tive power pertaining to its local municipal affairs, including but not
limited to the power to tax, and may perform any function pertaining
to its local municipal affairs, provided that such legislative power or
function is not denied to all municipalities by this Constitution or by
law without regard to classification by population, area, or otherwise
(b) Statewide Concern. The General Assembly may enact laws
on matters of statewide concern which do not pertain exclusively to
local municipal affairs, and such general laws shall take precedence
over municipal laws.
23 7
Section 12 is the heart of the home rule grant in the 1980 Proposal. By
inclusion in the constitution, the source of the home rule is by definition
constitutional rather than statutory. Municipal government is impor-
tant to the citizen/consumer;238 its broad authority to act with respect
to local matters should not be left to legislative whim. Inclusion in the
constitution is necessary. Section 12 removes Dillon's Rule as a con-
straint on local action;239 it also contains the specific delegation of the
power to tax required by the Arkansas Supreme Court.240
The grant of home rule is legislative rather than imperio. The leg-
islature can deny municipalities the legislative power or function by
enacting laws removing it from local control.241 While there is no clear
choice between imperio and legislative home rule, cities with legislative
home rule powers often enjoy a greater range of discretion than those
granted imperio status.24 2 Section 12(a) actually contains a very impor-
tant protection that limits the ability of the legislature to remove a
function from local control. By requiring that any law limiting the ex-
ercise of legislative power apply to all municipalities without classifica-
tion, the section precludes a legislature taking action aimed at one, or
even a substantial group that is less than all, municipalities. This provi-
sion does not allow removal of legislative power based on population or
classification (city of the first class, city of the second class, or incorpo-
237. Proposed ARK. CoNsT. of 1980 art. VI, § 12, supra note 1.
238. See supra notes 179-218 and accompanying text.
239. See supra notes 41-44 and accompanying text.
240. See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
241. Proposed ARK. CONST. of 1980 art. VI, § 12(a), supra note 1.




The 1874 constitution allows the legislature to treat municipal cor-
porations differently on either basis. 43 The drafters of the 1980 Propo-
sal decided that the legislature would be required to treat Little Rock
and Lake Village the same. Concerns of faction and dominance within
smaller segments of society, coupled with increased risks of externaliza-
tion of costs when the territorial area of the actor is smaller, suggest
that the legislature needs some flexibility. While careful study will be
required to determine the appropriate point to draw any line, two popu-
lation classifications should be sufficient. The provision should allow
differing treatment of municipal corporations in different
classifications.
Section 12 suggests a spirit of cooperation rather than antagonism
between the state and its municipal corporations, of partnership rather
than competition. The broad grant of legislative authority to deal with
local municipal affairs allows the innovative, constructive government
to be identified as a goal of the power allocation. The municipal corpo-
ration is not merely the puppet agent of the state, acting only when the
puppeteer pulls the string. Granting real power to the municipal gov-
ernment also makes it worth the citizen's time to participate in the
local governmental process - the participation has the possibility of
making a difference.2" And so the second goal identified is met as well.
Potential problems for local authority are inherent in any grant of
home rule not based on an inherent right of local self-government; this
proposal is no different. The courts must decide what is a "local munic-
ipal affair;" the courts must decide what constitutes a matter "of state-
wide concern which do[es] not pertain exclusively to local municipal
affairs." 2" If permitted, section 12(b) can swallow section 12(a). The
state is the sovereign, however. The allocation has been made; judicial
construction of the provision must be made keeping in mind the effect a
ruling for or against characterization as a local municipal affair or as a
matter of statewide concern will have on the viability of home rule in
Arkansas.
Section 12 needs a subsection (c) to make clear that some matters
are in fact matters of statewide concern, so that general laws take pre-
cedence over municipal laws. (1) An open meetings act and a freedom
243. ARK. CONST. art. XII, § 3; see supra notes 126-31 and accompanying text discussing
Ark. Const. amend. XIV.
244. Frug, supra note 36, at 1070.
245. Proposed ARK. CONST. of 1980 art. VI, § 12(b), supra note I.
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of information act that control municipal corporations should be en-
acted at the state level. Courts have held these subject matters to be
local municipal affairs2 46 Remember the second goal: the power alloca-.
tion should encourage meaningful citizen participation in the political
life of the municipality. Access to information and meetings of govern-
ment bodies is a must in achieving that goal.247 (2) Uniform bid re-
quirements for the purchase of property and acquisition of services
should be mandated throughout the state. Bid requirements are
designed to protect the public fisc. 2 48 By making the requirements uni-
form throughout the state, competition is encouraged as a bidder who
knows the process for one municipal corporation knows it for them all.
Section 13. Municipal Officers
(a) The members of the governing body of each municipality
shall be elected, and all other municipal officers may be elected or
otherwise selected as provided by law.
(b) The governing body of a municipality shall fix the compensa-
tion of municipal officers within the limits which may be set by the
General Assembly.
(c) Vacancies in any municipal office shall be filled as provided
by law. 49
Section 13(a) denies initiative in the method of selecting municipal of-
ficers. State control of the method of selecting the governing body is
appropriate, as the right to elect that body is fundamental to our demo-
cratic process. The provision should be amended to clearly authorize
the legislature to mandate ward representation. The lack of a represen-
tative who reflects the views of a minority segment of the community
makes voice illusory for those persons.250 The method of allocating
seats in the legislative body should initially be determined by the local
citizens. The legislature should be able to restructure that allocation so
long as it does so for all municipalities within one of the two population
246. See, e.g., Hills & Dales, Inc. v. City of Wooster, 448 N.E.2d 163 (Ohio Ct. App.
1982).
247. "The primary purpose of an open meeting law ... is to protect citizens from secret
decisions made without any opportunity for public input." 4 MCQUILLIN, supra note 36, §
13.07.10 (3d ed. rev. vol. 1992).
248. "The purpose of advertising is to give publicity to the contract in question and thereby
secure the utmost competition among bidders." 10 MCQUILLIN, supra note 36, § 29.52 (3d ed.
rev. vol. 1990).
249. Proposed ARK. CoNsT. of 1980 art. VI, § 13, supra note I.
250. See supra notes 183-85, 206-08 and accompanying text.
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categories permitted for legislative classification.251 In other words, al-
location of seats in the local legislative body should start as initiative,
no immunity.
The denial of initiative in the method of selecting other municipal
officers is unwarranted for the same reasons that denial of initiative in
selecting the form of organization is unreasonable.2 52 Section 13(a)
should be amended to provide that the city charter determines how all
other municipal officers will be selected; in the absence of a city charter
provision, provisions of state law will determine the selection process.
Because section 13(c) relates to municipal officers as well, it should
make the same distinction section 13(a) would if amended as
suggested.
Section 13(b) is also inappropriate for a denial of initiative. Com-
pensation to be paid municipal officers is not a matter of statewide con-
cern. While a state law requiring that a municipal corporation have
local provisions governing compensation would not be objectionable,
state minimums and maximums for compensation are an unwarranted
intrusion.
Section 15. Assessments for Local Improvements. The General As-
sembly may authorize and regulate assessments on real property for
local improvements. Such assessments shall be uniform in relation to
the benefits conferred.
25 3
The title of this section answers the question of where authority should
lie. If the assessment is for local improvements, why is the general as-
sembly given authority to regulate its use? Local assessments should be
initiative/no immunity. General standards may be imposed on a state-
wide basis, but the structure of and right to use local assessments
should be treated as a local municipal affair. The discussion infra con-
cerning taxation and indebtedness will more completely develop this
254reasoning.
Section 16. Limitations on County and Municipal Indebtedness. The
governing body of a county or municipality shall not make any pay-
ment or authorize any contract, warrant, or other evidence of indebt-
edness in excess of the revenues of such county or municipality for the
current fiscal year, except as authorized in this Constitution. The
251. See supra note 243 and accompanying text.
252. See supra note 236 and accompanying text.
253. Proposed ARK. CONST. of 1980 art. VI, § 15, supra note I.
254. See infra notes 263-71 and accompanying text.
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General Assembly may establish procedures permitting counties or
municipalities to borrow money from the State or its agencies and to
secure the repayment thereof by a pledge of their revenues for suc-
ceeding fiscal years. 25
5
The denial of initiative for incurring debt is appropriate. The state and
all of its political subdivisions are in competition for raising funds,
whether raised as current revenues or raised as borrowed funds. Com-
mon sense tells us that there is a maximum financial burden that citi-
zens can, should, and will sustain. The state must coordinate and allo-
cate the financial burden. But a danger exists in limiting the initiative
the municipal corporation enjoys in raising revenues. The state can
deny a municipal corporation the ability to raise adequate resources to
meet the service demands that its citizen/consumers are willing to
fund. A solution to that risk is proposed in the discussion of the bor-
rowing provisions contained in article VII of the 1980 Proposal.2 56
The comments to article VI, section 16 suggest that the second
sentence is meant to allow short term borrowing. 57 It is appropriate for
initiative to be denied for short term borrowing; abuse of such borrow-
ing is widely credited with the financial crises suffered by New York
City and Cleveland in the 19701s.258 But this provision is inadequate.
That it relates to short term borrowing should be made clear. More
important, however, the county or municipal corporation should not be
pledging revenues for succeeding fiscal years; it should be pledging rev-
enues anticipated but not yet received for the current fiscal year. As
written, the provision undermines the requirement of a balanced budget
implicit in the first sentence of the section.
Section 18. Special Districts. The General Assembly may provide for
the creation of special taxation districts with the power to levy ad
valorem and/or other taxes.
259
This section approaches the problem from the wrong direction. The
municipal corporation should have initiative with limited immunity as
described below. First, to protect our citizen/consumer, we should
255. Proposed ARK. CONST. of 1980 art. VI, § 16, supra note 1.
256. See infra notes 263-74 and accompanying text.
257. "The second sentence [of art. 6, § 16] allows the General Assembly to authorize
county and municipal short term indebtedness on stated conditions." Proposed ARK. CONST of
1980 art. VI, § 16, supra note 1.
258. See Fred Barbask, Cleveland Fails to Repay by Loan Deadline, WASH. POST, Dec. 16,
1978, at Al; Gelfand, supra note 26.
259. Proposed ARK. CONST. of 1980 art. VI, § 18, supra note 1.
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eliminate the myriad special districts that current laws authorize.2 60
The current provisions are so complex that nobody other than a munic-
ipal bond lawyer, a municipal financial adviser, or a real estate devel-
oper would have the incentive to puzzle through what is allowed and
under what circumstances. Second, these districts are usually local in
nature. If not confined to a municipality's limits, the home rule county
can exercise authority. The interest of the state lies in controlling the
overlapping, and thus the total, tax burden imposed on its citizens. A
provision requiring coordination and allocation of special district taxes
to the appropriate municipal corporation and county protects the legiti-
mate interest of the state. Section 18 should authorize municipal corpo-
rations and counties to create special taxation districts subject to one
general state law on the organization and operation of such a district
and subject to the overall tax rate and debt limitation of that municipal
corporation or county.
Section 19. Mandated Services. If the General Assembly or any State
agency shall mandate a local government unit to provide a service
which will require the expenditure of additional funds, all necessary
additional funding to finance the service shall be provided by the Gen-
eral Assembly.26 "
This section must be described as the parent of all initiative/immunity
power allocations. The concept of requiring state funding for newly
mandated state programs developed during the taxpayer revolts of the
1970's and 80's.22 Consider the impact of this provision for home rule.
Even if the new service falls within the "local municipal affair" cate-
gory, it must be paid for on a statewide basis. By limiting the ability of
the state to require dedication of locally raised funds to a new purpose,
the municipal corporation has truly been immunized from the state
limiting municipal initiative. As a practical matter, if the state can
mandate services and make the municipal corporation find the funding,
it denies the municipality the ability to provide other services with
those same funds. While the wisdom of this provision is beyond the
scope of this article, remember that all citizens could pay for a service
that should be paid for by the beneficiaries of the service. This section
260. See supra notes 62-84 and accompanying text.
261. Proposed ARK. CONST. Of 1980 art. VI, § 19, supra note 1.
262. See Justin J.T. Hughes & Garth B. Rieman, Comment, A New Generation of State
Tax and Expenditure Limitations, 22 HARV. J. ON LEcis. 269, 271 (1985); Mo. CONST. art. X, §
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may contain a two-edged sword for Arkansas residents.
The provisions of article VII (Finance and Taxation) of the 1980
Proposal will be analyzed together.
Section 9. County and Municipal Ad Valorem Taxes.
(c) The legislative body of a municipality may levy an ad
valorem tax on the taxable property within the municipality for its
general operations, not to exceed five mills on the assessed value
thereof.
(d) Upon approval by a majority of those voting on the question
at a general election, the legislative body of a municipality may levy
special ad valorem taxes for:
(1) maintaining public libraries;
(2) creating a pension fund for policemen;
(3) creating a pension fund for firemen; and
(4) other public purposes, specified by the legislative
body in. the question submitted at the election, which may
include additional millage for general operations.
(e) The General Assembly shall prescribe uniform procedures for
counties and municipalities for the levy and collection of taxes and for
submission of tax matters to the voters .... 263
Section 10. County and Municipal Bonded Indebtedness
(a) The legislative body of a county or municipality may author-
ize the issuance of bonds for capital improvements of a public nature,
as defined by the General Assembly, in amounts approved by a major-
ity of those voting on the question . . . . The maximum rate of any
special tax to pay bonded indebtedness shall be stated on the ballot
... . The tax to retire the bonds may be an ad valorem tax on real
and personal property. Other taxes may be authorized by the General
Assembly to retire the bonds.
(b) The limit of the principal amount of bonded indebtedness of
the county or municipality which may be outstanding and unpaid at
the time of issuance of any bonds . . . shall be a sum equal to ten
percent for a county, and twenty percent for a municipality, of the
total assessed value for tax purposes of real and personal property in
the county or municipality, as determined by the last tax assessment
264
Section 15. Exceptions
263. Proposed ARK. CONST. of 1980 art. VII, § 9, supra note I.
264. Id. § 10.
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(a) Unless otherwise provided by law, this Article does not apply
to indebtedness to be paid from a special assessment on the benefitted
property. Section 10 does not apply to bonds payable solely from the
revenues of a public enterprise or income from any specified sources,
nor to bonds payable from tax sources other than ad valorem property
taxes. 65
article VII of the 1980 Proposal has problems far more fundamental
than questions of initiative/immunity and the protection of local auton-
omy.2 66 Discussion will be limited to issues related to home rule,
however.
Section 9(c) limits the tax levy for general operating expenses to
five mills unless a higher limit is approved by the voters as allowed in
section 9(d)(4). 67 The initiative given to the municipality to levy a tax
without voter approval is both practical and necessary since it takes
funds to operate; imposing a maximum amount which can be levied
without voter approval is an important limit on immunity. Voice is
probably no more important than in the determination of the cost of
living in a municipality. As demonstrated, exit is not a viable option for
most citizens; nor is the exercise of the option to exit desirable to the
municipality.268 Establishing value is essential. At the same time, the
state must be able to influence the competition for funds among politi-
cal subdivisions and the state. Requiring voter approval for tax levies
over a stated rate aids the state in achieving an effective allocation of
tax resources. But the general assembly should be granted authority to
raise the five mill limit as long as the increase applies to all municipali-
ties. The review of Arkansas constitutional law included the repeated
amendment of article XIV, section 3 with respect to taxes for school
purposes, culminating in a removal of a specific limit.2 9 To avoid re-
265. Id. § 15.
266. A state constitution should direct the legislature to establish debt limitations for each
political subdivision of the state. The legislature should consider the effect of overlapping political
subdivisions, the functions performed by each political subdivision, and the resulting competition
for revenues and total fiscal burden on the residents of the state. The debt limitation must be all-
inclusive for the allocation of fiscal resources to be effective. Any commitment to spend funds
beyond the current fiscal year should be treated as debt. This means that the traditional approach
of defining debt limits will be inappropriate, as it does not reflect the actual fiscal power of a
municipal corporation. For a more thorough development of these ideas, see Charles W. Goldner,
Jr., State and Local Government Fiscal Responsibility: An Integrated Approach, 26 WAKE FOR-
EST L. REV. 925, 946-52 (1991).
267. Proposed ARK. CONST. of 1980 art. VII, § 9(c), (d)(4), supra note 1.
268. See supra notes 205-06 and accompanying text.
269. See supra notes 85-90 and accompanying text.
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peated amendments to the constitution, the general assembly should be
able to increase the tax levy allowed without voter approval. The state
has an interest in having viable, functioning municipalities. If over time
the five mill limit becomes unworkable, a general legislative grant rais-
ing the limit on the tax which can be imposed without voter approval
will protect the interests of the state, its municipal corporations, and
citizen/consumers.
In section 10(a), the issuer should determine when bonds are fund-
ing improvements of a public nature, not the general assembly. The
issuer's determination should not be immune from higher review, but
should be subject to judicial review under the public purpose analy-
sis. 2 7 0 This provision should be written so that the purpose of bond issu-
ance is an initiative/no immunity allocation of power. Creativity and
flexibility by the municipal corporation is one of the goals of the struc-
ture of power allocation. The inability of the issuer to decide debt is
appropriate (as long as total debt is within constitutional limits) will
frustrate that goal. The state's interest will be protected by (1) enact-
ing a workable overall debt limitation2 71 and (2) allowing judicial re-
view of the local issuer's determination. Finally, the last sentence of
section 10(a) vests too much authority in the general assembly. The
ability to raise funds in the most efficient way is essential for a viable,
competitive municipal corporation. Within the range of permitted
taxes, the municipal corporation should decide whether to apply tax
revenues to current expenses, repayment of borrowed funds, or both.
The state once again can protect its interest by enacting a workable
overall debt limitation. An additional protection for the state comes
from the ability of the state to reserve certain sources of revenues, in-
cluding from particular types of taxes, to itself in whole or in part.
Section 15 of the 1980 Proposal is both desirable and undesirable.
It is good that the 1980 Proposal deals with the question of revenue
bonds. The history of revenue bond financing in Arkansas,2 72 while
hardly "sordid, ' 273 illustrates the importance of having a unified ap-
270. The public purpose doctrine relates to both the raising and expenditure of revenues by
a municipal corporation. By requiring that all revenues, regardless of their source, be raised and
spent for a public purpose, the state retains a final check on the actions of its municipal corpora-
tions to ensure that they are acting in the interests of their citizens. The public purpose is often
determined by answering a question: Does the expenditure promote the public health, safety,
morals or general welfare? See Goldner, supra note 266, at 932-33, 951.
271. See supra note 266.
272. See supra notes 47-61 and accompanying text.
273. "in order that one may understand the sordid past of Arkansas bond law, a brief
1993]
UALR LAW JOURNAL
proach to control all forms of indebtedness. That approach must be
straightforward in order that citizen/consumers will have the under-
standing necessary to hold their municipality accountable. That ap-
proach must also integrate all indebtedness so that the state can effi-
ciently allocate to itself and its political subdivisions the power to
borrow. Totally excluding revenue bond indebtedness from constitu-
tional debt limits permits the tail to wag the dog.274 The constitutional
provisions should encourage cooperation, not competition; accountabil-
ity, not obfuscation.
V. CONCLUSION
An involved, proactive municipal corporation with a reasonable
range of powers and options can be an important part of the lives of the
citizens of Arkansas. Home rule granted in the constitution makes that
type of municipality a possibility. Legislative home rule with questions
of local autonomy decided as suggested in this article makes that possi-
bility more probable. The citizens of Arkansas should be given an op-
portunity to amend the Arkansas Constitution of 1874 so that both
they and their municipalities are empowered.
history is set forth." Sanford M. Brown, Comment, Municipal Bonds and Amendment 62: Clear-
ing Up a Serbonian Bog, 39 ARK. L. REV. 499, 499 (1986).
274. In 1980 state and local government net indebtedness totalled $202,167,000,000. Full
faith and credit (general obligation) indebtedness totalled $88,934,000,000 of that net amount, or
only 44%. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE
UNITED STATES: 1982-83, Tables No. 482, 494 (1982). Fifty-six percent of all indebtedness issued
cannot be ignored when defining debt limitations for a state and its political subdivisions. See
supra note 266.
.[Vol. 15:175
